# Clusev — PROD stack. Plain Docker Compose, no Portainer.
#
# Caddy is the ONLY host-exposed service (auto-TLS when APP_DOMAIN is set; plain
# HTTP on the bare IP otherwise). app/reverb are internal-only on the clusev net.
#
# Bootstrap + operate with ./install.sh. Manual deploy:
#   docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml build
#   docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml up -d
#   docker compose -f docker-compose.prod.yml exec -u app app php artisan migrate --force
name: clusev

# Locally-built tag by default; override CLUSEV_IMAGE with a GHCR digest
# (ghcr.io/<owner>/clusev@sha256:...) once CI signs + publishes images.
x-image: &image
  image: "${CLUSEV_IMAGE:-clusev-app:prod}"
  restart: unless-stopped
  env_file:
    - .env
  # Safety net: force debug OFF in prod so an uncaught error can never render a
  # stack trace to the user (the custom resources/views/errors/* pages show
  # instead). `environment` overrides any APP_DEBUG left in the prod .env.
  environment:
    APP_DEBUG: "false"
  networks:
    - clusev
  # Defense-in-depth (applies to app/reverb/queue/scheduler via <<: *image). no-new-privileges
  # blocks privilege escalation through setuid binaries — the image's drop-privileges startup only
  # LOWERS privileges, so it stays compatible. pids_limit is a fork-bomb backstop, set generously so
  # php-fpm/queue workers never hit it under normal load. cap_drop:[ALL] and read_only are
  # deliberately NOT set here: they need a per-service prod smoke test first (nginx :80 bind needs
  # NET_BIND_SERVICE, php-fpm/nginx/supervisor write pid/sockets/logs), so enable them after testing.
  security_opt:
    - "no-new-privileges:true"
  pids_limit: 1024
  # Reach the Docker host's sshd from the PHP layer so the "Clusev host" Docker view (and any other
  # host-targeted SSH) can talk to the real machine — same mapping the terminal sidecar uses.
  extra_hosts:
    - "host.docker.internal:host-gateway"

services:
  app:
    <<: *image
    build:
      context: .
      dockerfile: Dockerfile
      target: prod
      args:
        # Build the in-image `app` user with the HOST's clusev uid/gid so php-fpm can write the
        # bind-mounted ./run sentinel (install.sh chowns ./run to clusev). Without this the image
        # defaults to 1002 and on a host where clusev != 1002 the dashboard restart/update buttons
        # silently fail to write their sentinel. install.sh sets HOST_UID/HOST_GID from clusev.
        APP_UID: "${HOST_UID:-1002}"
        APP_GID: "${HOST_GID:-1002}"
    expose:
      - "80"
    volumes:
      # Restart sentinel — the dashboard writes ./run/restart.request here (inside the
      # container: storage/app/restart-signal/) to REQUEST a stack restart. A host-side
      # watcher (a scoped systemd .path unit — see docker/restart-sentinel/) sees the file
      # appear, runs `docker compose restart`, then deletes it. The container gets NO Docker
      # socket; it only writes a non-sensitive marker file on this shared bind mount.
      - ./run:/var/www/html/storage/app/restart-signal
    depends_on:
      mariadb:
        condition: service_healthy
      redis:
        condition: service_started

  reverb:
    <<: *image
    command: php artisan reverb:start --host=0.0.0.0 --port=8080
    expose:
      - "8080"
    depends_on:
      redis:
        condition: service_started

  queue:
    <<: *image
    command: php artisan queue:work --tries=3 --timeout=90 --sleep=1
    depends_on:
      mariadb:
        condition: service_healthy
      redis:
        condition: service_started

  # Runs the Laravel scheduler loop (every-minute clusev:wg-sample, daily clusev:prune-audit).
  scheduler:
    <<: *image
    command: php artisan schedule:work
    depends_on:
      mariadb:
        condition: service_healthy
      redis:
        condition: service_started

  # Terminal sidecar: WebSocket (/terminal/ws via Caddy) ↔ SSH PTY (per server) or local shell PTY
  # (the Clusev "host" terminal). Internal only; authorizes the single-use token before opening a PTY.
  terminal:
    build:
      context: ./docker/terminal
    image: "${CLUSEV_TERMINAL_IMAGE:-clusev-terminal:prod}"
    restart: unless-stopped
    # Reach the Docker host's sshd from the sidecar so the "Clusev host" terminal can SSH into the
    # real machine (host.docker.internal → the host gateway).
    extra_hosts:
      - "host.docker.internal:host-gateway"
    environment:
      TERMINAL_SIDECAR_SECRET: "${TERMINAL_SIDECAR_SECRET:-}"
      APP_INTERNAL_URL: "http://app:80"
    expose:
      - "3000"
    security_opt:
      - "no-new-privileges:true"
    pids_limit: 512
    networks:
      - clusev

  caddy:
    # Pinned by digest (supply-chain integrity): a mutable tag could silently swap the image under us.
    # Bump: docker buildx imagetools inspect caddy:2-alpine --format '{{.Manifest.Digest}}'
    image: caddy:2-alpine@sha256:5f5c8640aae01df9654968d946d8f1a56c497f1dd5c5cda4cf95ab7c14d58648
    restart: unless-stopped
    ports:
      - "${APP_PORT:-80}:80"
      - "443:443"
      - "443:443/udp"        # HTTP/3
    environment:
      # Domain is dashboard-driven via on-demand TLS (Caddy asks app:/_caddy/ask), so
      # no SITE_ADDRESS is needed. Only the ACME contact comes from .env.
      ACME_EMAIL: "${ACME_EMAIL:-admin@localhost}"
      # External reverse-proxy TLS: set to the upstream proxy's EXACT address (a /32, or its
      # tightest CIDR) so Caddy trusts its X-Forwarded-Proto/-For. Leave as 127.0.0.1/32 when
      # Caddy terminates TLS itself. SECURITY: never a broad range / 0.0.0.0/0 — a too-wide value
      # lets any client forge X-Forwarded-For and defeat the IP-keyed throttles + brute-force ban.
      TRUSTED_PROXY_CIDR: "${TRUSTED_PROXY_CIDR:-127.0.0.1/32}"
    volumes:
      # Mount the DIRECTORY (not the single Caddyfile): a single-file bind mount keeps the
      # original inode, so a `git pull` that REPLACES the file would not reach a running
      # container. A directory mount always reflects the current file, so `caddy reload` /
      # a recreate picks up Caddyfile changes on update.
      - ./docker/caddy:/etc/caddy:ro
      - caddy-data:/data      # ACME account + certs — MUST persist across recreate
      - caddy-config:/config
    security_opt:
      - "no-new-privileges:true"
    pids_limit: 512
    depends_on:
      - app
      - reverb
      - terminal
    networks:
      - clusev

  mariadb:
    # Pinned by digest (see caddy). Bump: docker buildx imagetools inspect mariadb:11 --format '{{.Manifest.Digest}}'
    image: mariadb:11@sha256:efb4959ef2c835cd735dbc388eb9ad6aab0c78dd64febcd51bc17481111890c4
    restart: unless-stopped
    environment:
      MARIADB_DATABASE: "${DB_DATABASE:-clusev}"
      MARIADB_USER: "${DB_USERNAME:-clusev}"
      MARIADB_PASSWORD: "${DB_PASSWORD:?set DB_PASSWORD in .env}"
      MARIADB_ROOT_PASSWORD: "${DB_ROOT_PASSWORD:?set DB_ROOT_PASSWORD in .env}"
    volumes:
      - mariadb-data:/var/lib/mysql
      # Quiet the protocol-normal "Aborted connection" WARNINGs (log_warnings=1) + worker timeouts.
      - ./docker/mariadb/tuning.cnf:/etc/mysql/conf.d/tuning.cnf:ro
    healthcheck:
      test: ["CMD", "healthcheck.sh", "--connect", "--innodb_initialized"]
      interval: 10s
      timeout: 5s
      retries: 30
    security_opt:
      - "no-new-privileges:true"
    pids_limit: 1024
    networks:
      - clusev
    # no host ports in prod — DB is reachable only on the internal clusev network

  redis:
    # Pinned by digest (see caddy). Bump: docker buildx imagetools inspect redis:7-alpine --format '{{.Manifest.Digest}}'
    image: redis:7-alpine@sha256:6ab0b6e7381779332f97b8ca76193e45b0756f38d4c0dcda72dbb3c32061ab99
    restart: unless-stopped
    command: redis-server --appendonly yes --requirepass "${REDIS_PASSWORD:?set REDIS_PASSWORD in .env}"
    volumes:
      - redis-data:/data
    security_opt:
      - "no-new-privileges:true"
    pids_limit: 512
    networks:
      - clusev

volumes:
  mariadb-data:
  redis-data:
  caddy-data:
  caddy-config:

networks:
  clusev:
    driver: bridge