clusev/app/Models
boban 265136fc42 Metric history fix, service-failure audit trail, alert channels + secret-retarget hardening
Metric history: the per-minute sampler (clusev:sample-metrics) now reads
cpu/mem/disk from the `servers` DB row — the same source the live gauges read,
shared via MariaDB — instead of a cross-container Redis cache the poller may
not share in prod. It gates on last_seen_at freshness (skip offline/unpolled)
and keeps `load` as a best-effort cache read. History now fills whenever the
gauges have data, independent of the cache driver or container split — the
prod detail page no longer shows "Noch keine Verlaufsdaten" after hours.

Service-action failures are persisted: a failed systemctl start/stop/restart
writes a red service.<op>.failed AuditEvent with the FULL systemctl reason in
meta['output'] (mb_scrub-ed, 4000-cap), shown expandable in the audit log — a
truncated, ephemeral toast is no longer the only trace. The failure toast is a
short pointer to the audit log, level=error, and error toasts now linger 9s.

Alert delivery: a warning banner appears on the alerts page when NO channel
would reach anyone (no SMTP + no safe webhook + no Gotify). A new Gotify push
channel (server URL + encrypted app token) posts title/message/priority with
the token in X-Gotify-Key; a self-hosted LAN Gotify is allowed (scheme-checked,
not private-range-blocked like the SSRF-guarded webhooks) — a real push when a
service goes down, no e-mail needed.

Secret-retarget hardening (Codex-found class): changing a target while leaving
its secret blank could send the OLD secret to the NEW endpoint. Closed for the
Gotify token, the SMTP password (save + test-send + the runtime mailer), and
the host-terminal SSH credential (username/port change) — each drops/forbids
the stale secret before the new target is stored. Setting::uncached() reads the
security-sensitive keys DB-direct so a cache-repopulation race can't re-pair an
old secret with a new target. Three Codex rounds, clean; 778 tests.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-08 22:21:54 +02:00
..
AlertIncident.php fix(ui): sidebar alert/threat badges update at once, not up to 60s late 2026-07-06 20:22:51 +02:00
AlertRule.php feat(alerts): threshold alerting + notifications (feature 2/8) 2026-07-05 20:07:54 +02:00
AuditEvent.php Metric history fix, service-failure audit trail, alert channels + secret-retarget hardening 2026-07-08 22:21:54 +02:00
BannedIp.php feat(auth): BannedIp model + migration 2026-06-20 17:26:28 +02:00
CertEndpoint.php feat(security): TLS certificate expiry monitoring (feature 7/8) 2026-07-05 20:57:53 +02:00
HealthCheck.php feat(uptime): HTTP/TCP health checks + status board (feature 8/8) 2026-07-05 21:04:14 +02:00
HostCredential.php fix(docker): admin-gate the host target + honour a "0" key passphrase (Codex review) 2026-07-05 23:43:18 +02:00
MetricSample.php feat(metrics): persistent resource-history graph on the Server-Details page 2026-06-25 01:31:27 +02:00
Runbook.php feat(commands): ad-hoc fleet commands + runbooks (feature 4/8) 2026-07-05 20:38:09 +02:00
Server.php feat(fleet): server groups — organise the fleet + filter (feature 1/8) 2026-07-05 19:36:17 +02:00
ServerGroup.php feat(fleet): server groups — organise the fleet + filter (feature 1/8) 2026-07-05 19:36:17 +02:00
Setting.php Metric history fix, service-failure audit trail, alert channels + secret-retarget hardening 2026-07-08 22:21:54 +02:00
SshCredential.php chore(audit): full code sweep — fix open-redirect, drop dead code, clean docs 2026-06-13 12:54:26 +02:00
TerminalSession.php security: harden proxy trust + model mass-assignment + terminal-token log hygiene 2026-06-26 07:16:10 +02:00
User.php feat(rbac): role enum + column + gates foundation (admin>operator>viewer) 2026-07-05 00:42:16 +02:00
WebauthnCredential.php fix(webauthn): hash-indexed credential ids + reset keys on 2FA disable 2026-06-14 18:40:24 +02:00
WgTrafficSample.php feat(wg): wg_traffic_samples table + model 2026-06-20 23:59:11 +02:00