clusev/app/Livewire/Servers/Show.php

609 lines
22 KiB
PHP

<?php
namespace App\Livewire\Servers;
use App\Models\AuditEvent;
use App\Models\Server;
use App\Services\Fail2banService;
use App\Services\FirewallService;
use App\Services\FleetService;
use App\Services\HardeningService;
use App\Support\Confirm\ConfirmToken;
use App\Support\Confirm\InvalidConfirmToken;
use App\Support\Os\OsDetector;
use Illuminate\Support\Facades\Auth;
use Illuminate\Support\Str;
use Livewire\Attributes\Layout;
use Livewire\Attributes\On;
use Livewire\Attributes\Url;
use Livewire\Component;
use Throwable;
#[Layout('layouts.app')]
class Show extends Component
{
/** Route-model-bound by uuid (R11). */
public Server $server;
/** Active detail tab: 'overview' | 'docker' | 'terminal' (deep-linkable via ?tab=). */
#[Url]
public string $tab = 'overview';
/** Page <title>; localized at runtime (attributes can't call __()). */
public function title(): string
{
return __('servers.show_title');
}
public bool $connected = false;
public bool $ready = false;
public float $loadAvg = 0;
public array $volumes = [];
public array $interfaces = [];
public array $hardening = [];
/** Firewall state (installed/active/defaults/rules) for the Firewall-Regeln panel. */
public array $firewall = [];
/** fail2ban state (jails/banned IPs/whitelist) for the fail2ban-Status panel. */
public array $fail2ban = [];
/** Input for adding an IP/CIDR to the fail2ban whitelist. */
public string $newIgnoreIp = '';
/** Detected OS tooling (family/package manager/firewall) for the identity panel. */
public array $os = [];
public array $sshKeys = [];
/**
* Pull a live snapshot over SSH and persist identity/metrics onto the row.
* On any failure (no credential, unreachable) the page renders an offline
* state from the last persisted values instead of crashing.
*/
public function mount(): void
{
// Viewing a server's details makes it the ACTIVE server, so the sidebar switcher
// (and the scoped sections) reflect the server on screen. Set ONLY at mount — i.e.
// once per deliberate navigation — so a slow in-flight load() or a parallel tab
// can never write a stale value over a newer selection (the single-session active
// server is last-writer-wins; we keep writes to deliberate navigations only).
session(['active_server_id' => $this->server->id]);
// identity + gauges render from the persisted row immediately;
// the live snapshot loads lazily via wire:init -> load().
}
/** Lazy: pull the full SSH snapshot after the shell renders, behind skeletons. */
public function load(FleetService $fleet): void
{
try {
$snap = $fleet->snapshot($this->server);
$id = $snap['identity'];
$rootUsed = collect($snap['volumes'])->firstWhere('mount', '/')['used'] ?? $this->server->disk;
$this->server->forceFill([
'cpu' => $snap['metrics']['cpu'],
'mem' => $snap['metrics']['mem'],
'disk' => $rootUsed,
'os' => $id['os'],
'hostname' => $id['hostname'],
'uptime' => $id['uptime'],
'status' => 'online',
'last_seen_at' => now(),
'specs' => [
'cores' => $id['cores'],
'ram_gb' => $id['ram_gb'],
'disk_gb' => $id['disk_gb'],
'arch' => $id['arch'],
'kernel' => $id['kernel'],
'virt' => $id['virt'],
],
])->save();
$this->volumes = $snap['volumes'];
$this->interfaces = $snap['interfaces'];
$this->sshKeys = $snap['sshKeys'];
// Detected OS profile (cached) — surfaces the package manager + firewall
// tooling and drives which hardening features are offered.
try {
// fresh probe on each full load; primes the 1h cache the hardening,
// firewall and update reads reuse within this request cycle.
$profile = app(OsDetector::class)->detect($this->server, fresh: true);
$this->os = [
'familyLabel' => $profile->familyLabel(),
'packageManager' => $profile->packageManager,
'firewallTool' => $profile->firewallTool,
'serviceManager' => $profile->serviceManager,
];
} catch (Throwable) {
$this->os = [];
}
// Hardening state is a separate PRIVILEGED read (sshd -T + pkg checks).
try {
$this->hardening = app(HardeningService::class)->state($this->server);
} catch (Throwable) {
$this->hardening = [];
}
// Firewall rules/defaults (separate PRIVILEGED read; empty on failure).
try {
$this->firewall = app(FirewallService::class)->status($this->server);
} catch (Throwable) {
$this->firewall = [];
}
// fail2ban jails/banned IPs/whitelist (separate PRIVILEGED read).
try {
$this->fail2ban = app(Fail2banService::class)->status($this->server);
} catch (Throwable) {
$this->fail2ban = [];
}
$this->loadAvg = (float) ($snap['metrics']['load'] ?? 0);
$this->connected = true;
} catch (Throwable) {
$this->connected = false;
if ($this->server->status !== 'offline') {
$this->server->forceFill(['status' => 'offline'])->save();
}
}
$this->ready = true;
}
/** Refresh the live gauges from the poller-updated row (wire:poll). */
public function pollMetrics(): void
{
// Only the Übersicht tab shows live metrics; skip the refresh/re-render on Docker/Terminal.
if ($this->tab !== 'overview') {
return;
}
$this->server->refresh();
}
/**
* Revoke an SSH key (R5): opens the confirm modal, which writes the
* AuditEvent and re-dispatches `keyRemoved`. SSH layer removal lands later.
*/
public function confirmKeyRemoval(int $index): void
{
abort_unless(auth()->user()?->can('manage-fleet'), 403);
$key = $this->sshKeys[$index] ?? null;
if ($key === null) {
return;
}
$fingerprint = $key['fingerprint'];
$comment = $key['comment'];
$this->dispatch('openModal',
component: 'modals.confirm-action',
arguments: [
'heading' => __('servers.confirm_remove_key_heading'),
'body' => __('servers.confirm_remove_key_body', ['name' => $comment, 'server' => $this->server->name]),
'confirmLabel' => __('common.remove'),
'danger' => true,
'icon' => 'trash',
'notify' => __('servers.notify_key_removed', ['name' => $comment]),
'token' => ConfirmToken::issue(
'keyRemoved',
['fingerprint' => $fingerprint],
'ssh_key.remove',
"{$comment} · {$this->server->name}",
$this->server->id,
),
],
);
}
/** Applies the confirmed key removal over SSH, then reloads the list. */
#[On('keyRemoved')]
public function removeKey(string $confirmToken, FleetService $fleet): void
{
// Re-gate on consume: ConfirmToken is uid-bound, not role-bound, so a token issued
// while the user could manage the fleet must still be refused after a demotion.
abort_unless(auth()->user()?->can('manage-fleet'), 403);
try {
$payload = ConfirmToken::consume($confirmToken, 'keyRemoved');
} catch (InvalidConfirmToken) {
return; // forged / replayed / direct-bypass attempt — no-op
}
if (($payload['serverId'] ?? null) !== $this->server->id) {
return; // token sealed for a different server — refuse to retarget
}
$fingerprint = $payload['params']['fingerprint'];
try {
$fleet->removeAuthorizedKey($this->server, $fingerprint);
} catch (Throwable $e) {
$this->dispatch('notify', message: __('servers.notify_remove_failed', ['error' => $e->getMessage()]));
return;
}
$this->reloadKeys($fleet);
}
/** Re-read the authorized keys after an add/remove. */
#[On('keyChanged')]
public function reloadKeys(FleetService $fleet): void
{
try {
$this->sshKeys = $fleet->sshKeys($this->server);
} catch (Throwable) {
// keep the current list on failure
}
}
/** Credential changed -> reconnect with the new login and re-pull the snapshot. */
#[On('credentialChanged')]
public function reloadAfterCredential(FleetService $fleet): void
{
$this->server->refresh();
$this->ready = false;
$this->load($fleet);
}
/** Open the file manager scoped to this server. */
public function openFiles()
{
session(['active_server_id' => $this->server->id]);
return $this->redirect(route('files.index'), navigate: true);
}
/**
* Toggle the credential between aktiv/gesperrt (sets/clears disabled_at).
* The CredentialVault already refuses a disabled credential, so this is the
* operator's kill-switch for a deposited login without deleting it.
*/
public function toggleCredential(): void
{
abort_unless(auth()->user()?->can('manage-fleet'), 403);
$cred = $this->server->credential;
if (! $cred) {
return;
}
$disable = ! $cred->disabled;
$cred->forceFill(['disabled_at' => $disable ? now() : null])->save();
AuditEvent::create([
'user_id' => Auth::id(),
'server_id' => $this->server->id,
'actor' => Auth::user()?->name ?? 'system',
'action' => $disable ? 'credential.disable' : 'credential.enable',
'target' => $this->server->name.' · '.$cred->username,
'ip' => request()->ip(),
]);
$this->server->refresh();
$this->dispatch('notify', message: $disable ? __('servers.notify_access_locked') : __('servers.notify_access_unlocked'));
}
/**
* Delete the credential (R5): opens the confirm modal, which writes the
* AuditEvent and re-dispatches `credentialDeleted`.
*/
public function confirmDeleteCredential(): void
{
abort_unless(auth()->user()?->can('manage-fleet'), 403);
$cred = $this->server->credential;
if (! $cred) {
return;
}
$this->dispatch('openModal',
component: 'modals.confirm-action',
arguments: [
'heading' => __('servers.confirm_delete_credential_heading'),
'body' => __('servers.confirm_delete_credential_body', ['server' => $this->server->name]),
'confirmLabel' => __('common.delete'),
'danger' => true,
'icon' => 'trash',
'notify' => __('servers.notify_access_deleted'),
'token' => ConfirmToken::issue(
'credentialDeleted',
[],
'credential.delete',
$this->server->name.' · '.$cred->username,
$this->server->id,
),
],
);
}
/** Applies the confirmed credential deletion, then refreshes the row. */
#[On('credentialDeleted')]
public function deleteCredential(string $confirmToken): void
{
// Re-gate on consume: ConfirmToken is uid-bound, not role-bound, so a token issued
// while the user could manage the fleet must still be refused after a demotion.
abort_unless(auth()->user()?->can('manage-fleet'), 403);
try {
$payload = ConfirmToken::consume($confirmToken, 'credentialDeleted');
} catch (InvalidConfirmToken) {
return; // forged / replayed / direct-bypass attempt — no-op
}
if (($payload['serverId'] ?? null) !== $this->server->id) {
return; // token sealed for a different server — refuse to retarget
}
$this->server->credential()->delete();
$this->server->refresh();
}
/**
* A hardening/firewall action was applied -> re-pull the snapshot so the
* checklist + firewall row reflect the new state.
*/
#[On('hardeningApplied')]
public function reloadSnapshot(): void
{
// A hardening/fail2ban toggle changes only the SECURITY reads. Re-probe the OS profile
// (a firewall "Aktivieren" may have just INSTALLED the tool the panels key off) and
// re-read the three security states — but keep the page rendered (no skeleton flip)
// and skip the full metrics/volumes/keys snapshot: that halves the SSH round-trips
// and the operator sees the page update in place instead of a long blank reload.
// The Sicherheit/Firewall panels show a wire:loading cue targeting this method.
$this->server->refresh();
try {
$profile = app(OsDetector::class)->detect($this->server, fresh: true);
$this->os = [
'familyLabel' => $profile->familyLabel(),
'packageManager' => $profile->packageManager,
'firewallTool' => $profile->firewallTool,
'serviceManager' => $profile->serviceManager,
];
} catch (Throwable) {
// keep the current profile on failure
}
try {
$this->hardening = app(HardeningService::class)->state($this->server);
} catch (Throwable) {
$this->hardening = [];
}
try {
$this->firewall = app(FirewallService::class)->status($this->server);
} catch (Throwable) {
$this->firewall = [];
}
try {
$this->fail2ban = app(Fail2banService::class)->status($this->server);
} catch (Throwable) {
$this->fail2ban = [];
}
}
/**
* Delete a firewall rule (R5): opens the confirm modal, which writes the
* AuditEvent and re-dispatches `firewallRuleDelete` (handled below).
*/
public function confirmDeleteRule(int $index): void
{
abort_unless(auth()->user()?->can('manage-network'), 403);
$rule = $this->firewall['rules'][$index] ?? null;
if ($rule === null) {
return;
}
$spec = $rule['spec'] ?? '';
$label = $rule['label'] ?? ($rule['raw'] ?? $spec);
$this->dispatch('openModal',
component: 'modals.confirm-action',
arguments: [
'heading' => __('servers.confirm_remove_rule_heading'),
'body' => __('servers.confirm_remove_rule_body', ['label' => $label, 'server' => $this->server->name]),
'confirmLabel' => __('common.remove'),
'danger' => true,
'icon' => 'trash',
// No premature audit/notify — the handler records the real outcome
// only after the remote command returns (audit reflects success).
'notify' => '',
'token' => ConfirmToken::issue(
'firewallRuleDelete',
['spec' => $spec, 'label' => $label],
serverId: $this->server->id,
),
],
);
}
/** Applies the confirmed rule deletion over SSH, then audits + reloads on success. */
#[On('firewallRuleDelete')]
public function deleteFirewallRule(string $confirmToken, FirewallService $firewall): void
{
// Re-gate on consume: ConfirmToken is uid-bound, not role-bound, so a token issued
// while the user could manage the network must still be refused after a demotion.
abort_unless(auth()->user()?->can('manage-network'), 403);
try {
$payload = ConfirmToken::consume($confirmToken, 'firewallRuleDelete');
} catch (InvalidConfirmToken) {
return; // forged / replayed / direct-bypass attempt — no-op
}
if (($payload['serverId'] ?? null) !== $this->server->id) {
return; // token sealed for a different server — refuse to retarget
}
$spec = $payload['params']['spec'];
$label = $payload['params']['label'];
try {
$res = $firewall->deleteRule($this->server, $spec);
} catch (Throwable $e) {
$this->dispatch('notify', message: __('servers.notify_remove_failed', ['error' => Str::limit($e->getMessage(), 90)]));
return;
}
// The rule was already gone — inform, refresh, but do NOT audit a non-event.
if (! empty($res['notFound'])) {
$this->dispatch('notify', message: __('servers.notify_rule_not_found'));
$this->reloadFirewall($firewall);
return;
}
if (! $res['ok']) {
$this->dispatch('notify', message: __('servers.notify_remove_failed', ['error' => Str::limit($res['output'] ?: __('servers.error_unknown'), 90)]));
return;
}
AuditEvent::create([
'user_id' => Auth::id(),
'server_id' => $this->server->id,
'actor' => Auth::user()?->name ?? 'system',
'action' => 'firewall.rule_delete',
'target' => $label.' · '.$this->server->name,
'ip' => request()->ip(),
]);
$this->dispatch('notify', message: __('servers.notify_firewall_rule_removed'));
$this->reloadFirewall($firewall);
}
/** Re-read the firewall state after an add/delete/default change. */
#[On('firewallChanged')]
public function reloadFirewall(FirewallService $firewall): void
{
try {
$this->firewall = $firewall->status($this->server);
} catch (Throwable) {
// keep the current state on failure
}
}
/** Unban a fail2ban IP — recovery action, so a direct (audited) click, no R5 modal. */
public function unbanIp(string $jail, string $ip, Fail2banService $fail2ban): void
{
abort_unless(auth()->user()?->can('manage-network'), 403);
try {
$res = $fail2ban->unban($this->server, $jail, $ip);
} catch (Throwable $e) {
$this->dispatch('notify', message: __('servers.notify_unban_failed', ['error' => Str::limit($e->getMessage(), 90)]));
return;
}
if (! $res['ok']) {
$this->dispatch('notify', message: __('servers.notify_unban_failed', ['error' => Str::limit($res['output'] ?: __('servers.error_unknown'), 90)]));
return;
}
$this->audit('fail2ban.unban', $ip.' · '.$jail.' · '.$this->server->name);
$this->dispatch('notify', message: __('servers.notify_ip_unbanned', ['ip' => $ip]));
$this->reloadFail2ban($fail2ban);
}
/** Add an IP/CIDR to the fail2ban whitelist (ignoreip) — non-destructive, direct + audited. */
public function addIgnore(Fail2banService $fail2ban): void
{
abort_unless(auth()->user()?->can('manage-network'), 403);
$ip = trim($this->newIgnoreIp);
if ($ip === '') {
return;
}
try {
$res = $fail2ban->addIgnoreIp($this->server, $ip);
} catch (Throwable $e) {
$this->dispatch('notify', message: __('servers.notify_whitelist_error', ['error' => Str::limit($e->getMessage(), 90)]));
return;
}
if (! $res['ok']) {
$this->dispatch('notify', message: __('servers.notify_whitelist_error', ['error' => Str::limit($res['output'] ?: __('servers.error_failed'), 90)]));
return;
}
if (! empty($res['noop'])) {
$this->newIgnoreIp = '';
$this->dispatch('notify', message: $res['output']);
return;
}
$this->audit('fail2ban.ignoreip_add', $ip.' · '.$this->server->name);
$this->newIgnoreIp = '';
$this->dispatch('notify', message: __('servers.notify_ip_whitelisted', ['ip' => $ip]));
$this->reloadFail2ban($fail2ban);
}
/** Remove an IP/CIDR from the fail2ban whitelist — direct + audited (loopback is refused by the service). */
public function removeIgnore(string $ip, Fail2banService $fail2ban): void
{
abort_unless(auth()->user()?->can('manage-network'), 403);
try {
$res = $fail2ban->removeIgnoreIp($this->server, $ip);
} catch (Throwable $e) {
$this->dispatch('notify', message: __('servers.notify_whitelist_error', ['error' => Str::limit($e->getMessage(), 90)]));
return;
}
if (! $res['ok']) {
$this->dispatch('notify', message: __('servers.notify_whitelist_error', ['error' => Str::limit($res['output'] ?: __('servers.error_failed'), 90)]));
return;
}
if (! empty($res['noop'])) {
$this->dispatch('notify', message: $res['output']);
return;
}
$this->audit('fail2ban.ignoreip_remove', $ip.' · '.$this->server->name);
$this->dispatch('notify', message: __('servers.notify_ip_unwhitelisted', ['ip' => $ip]));
$this->reloadFail2ban($fail2ban);
}
/** Re-read fail2ban state after an unban/ban/whitelist change. */
#[On('fail2banChanged')]
public function reloadFail2ban(Fail2banService $fail2ban): void
{
try {
$this->fail2ban = $fail2ban->status($this->server);
} catch (Throwable) {
// keep the current state on failure
}
}
/** Write one AuditEvent for a fail2ban action (success path only). */
private function audit(string $action, string $target): void
{
AuditEvent::create([
'user_id' => Auth::id(),
'server_id' => $this->server->id,
'actor' => Auth::user()?->name ?? 'system',
'action' => $action,
'target' => $target,
'ip' => request()->ip(),
]);
}
public function render()
{
return view('livewire.servers.show')->title($this->title());
}
}