CluPilotCloud/tests/Feature
nexxo 0d9b62eb50 feat(vpn): ownership, a Developer role, and password-gated config retrieval
Reworked after a design consultation with Codex, which pushed back on my first
proposal in three useful ways.

Ownership and rights:
- vpn.manage split into vpn.view.all and vpn.manage.all. Seeing an access is
  not managing it, and neither is holding its private key.
- Record-level rules live in VpnPeerPolicy, not in permissions: an access
  belongs to a person, and ownership is what grants sight of it. Every operator
  reaches the page, but sees only their own unless they may see all.
- Issuing an access is not self-service — it reaches the management network, so
  it needs vpn.manage.all even for oneself.
- New Developer role: sees everything, manages nothing. Writing code does not
  imply authority over other people's access.
- kind (staff|host|system) replaces a null user_id that had to mean two
  different things at once.

Config storage, opt-in per access:
- Downloading is owner-only — explicitly NOT for view.all or manage.all. An
  admin who needs access revokes this one and issues their own, which keeps the
  record of who holds what honest.
- The password is asked on EVERY retrieval, rate-limited. Laravel's
  password.confirm keeps a 15-minute session stamp, which would authorise
  unlimited later downloads from an unattended browser.
- Stored under VPN_CONFIG_KEY, not APP_KEY: a leaked application key must not
  also hand over the management network. Purged on revocation and when a staff
  member is revoked — console taken away, tunnel left open was the worst case.
- The plaintext never enters a Livewire snapshot (the page polls every five
  seconds); the component carries an opaque handle instead.

Also: copy button works without HTTPS again (navigator.clipboard only exists in
a secure context, so over http it silently did nothing), plus config download
as a file and a QR code for the mobile apps.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-25 22:31:54 +02:00
..
Admin feat(vpn): ownership, a Developer role, and password-gated config retrieval 2026-07-25 22:31:54 +02:00
Auth fix(auth): throttle Fortify endpoints (registration had no limiter — signup-spam guard) 2026-07-25 18:38:44 +02:00
Provisioning feat(admin): VPN access management with live peer state 2026-07-25 21:38:12 +02:00
BillingTest.php feat(portal): billing page — current plan, upgrades, extra storage, add-ons 2026-07-25 13:36:52 +02:00
ComponentTest.php feat(portal): Fortify auth + Login/2FA/Dashboard + component kit 2026-07-25 01:20:25 +02:00
DashboardTest.php feat(portal): Fortify auth + Login/2FA/Dashboard + component kit 2026-07-25 01:20:25 +02:00
ExampleTest.php chore: bootstrap CluPilot control-plane (Laravel 13, Docker stack) 2026-07-25 00:21:30 +02:00
ImpersonationTest.php fix(admin): harden impersonation + datacenter code per Codex review 2026-07-25 13:50:16 +02:00
OperatorInPortalTest.php fix(portal): no silent no-ops without a customer; maintenance visible per instance; maintenance form redesign 2026-07-25 19:10:44 +02:00
PortalTabsTest.php feat(portal): bind the cloud card to the real instance (plan/seats/domain/quota) so the maintenance badge matches it 2026-07-25 19:14:42 +02:00
SeatsTest.php feat(portal): seats management — invite/role/revoke against plan limit 2026-07-25 14:40:18 +02:00
SettingsTest.php fix(portal): enforce customer lifecycle per Codex review 2026-07-25 14:45:03 +02:00
WelcomeTest.php feat(landing): public marketing homepage at / (+ legal placeholders) 2026-07-25 08:59:39 +02:00