80 lines
3.6 KiB
Markdown
80 lines
3.6 KiB
Markdown
# Deploying CluPilot on a fresh server
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Developed locally, deployed by pulling. Two scripts do the work:
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```bash
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# once, on a fresh Debian/Ubuntu server — as root, because of apt
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bash deploy/install.sh
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# afterwards, as the service account — never as root
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sudo -u clupilot bash -c 'cd /opt/clupilot && bash deploy/update.sh'
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```
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The installer needs root only to install packages and open the firewall. It
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creates a `clupilot` account that owns the checkout and runs Docker; the
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application never runs as root, and `update.sh` refuses to start if you try.
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That account has no password login — membership in the docker group is
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root-equivalent on the host, which is inherent to Docker and the reason it is
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reachable only by `sudo -u` or an SSH key.
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## What the installer does
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Docker, git and `wireguard-tools`; clone into `/opt/clupilot`; generate every
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secret (`APP_KEY`, `VPN_CONFIG_KEY`, database password, Reverb keys); start the
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stack; migrate; create the WireGuard hub and print its public key; create your
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Owner account; close the firewall down to 22, 80, 443 and 51820/udp.
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It is safe to re-run: an existing `.env` is kept and the hub key is never
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regenerated — doing so would silently disconnect every onboarded host.
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### Unattended, from a bare server
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The only thing to install by hand is git:
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```bash
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apt-get update && apt-get install -y git
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git clone https://git.bave.dev/boban/CluPilotCloud.git /tmp/clupilot
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bash /tmp/clupilot/deploy/install.sh --env-file /root/clupilot.env
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```
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`deploy/clupilot.env.example` is the template. Put the real file on the server
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as `/root/clupilot.env` with mode 600 **before** starting — the installer warns
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if it is readable by anyone else. Keep the master copy in a password manager,
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never in the repository (`clupilot.env` is gitignored for that reason).
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After a successful run the working values live in `/opt/clupilot/.env`, so the
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bootstrap copy can go: `shred -u /root/clupilot.env`.
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The file also carries the operational secrets — Hetzner DNS, Stripe, SMTP, the
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Proxmox SSH key path. Those are optional: the install succeeds without them and
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the corresponding features simply stay dark until they are filled in.
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## Order of the update
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Migrations run **before** the new containers take traffic: code that expects a
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column the database does not have yet answers with 500s. The image is rebuilt
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only when `docker/`, composer or npm manifests actually changed. Queue workers
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are restarted at the end — they are long-running PHP processes and keep the old
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classes in memory otherwise. That one bit us during development: a fixed job
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kept failing until the worker was restarted.
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## What the installer deliberately leaves to you
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- **DNS and TLS.** Put a reverse proxy in front (Zoraxy, Caddy, nginx). The
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console hostname must not be publicly resolvable: `/admin` answers only on
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the hostnames in `ADMIN_HOSTS` and 404s everywhere else, but keeping it out
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of public DNS is the layer above that.
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- **`STRIPE_WEBHOOK_SECRET`.** Stripe dashboard → Developers → Webhooks →
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`https://<app-domain>/webhooks/stripe`, events `checkout.session.completed`
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and `checkout.session.async_payment_succeeded`. The secret starts with
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`whsec_` and differs between test and live mode.
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- **Backups.** At minimum the MariaDB volume and `/etc/wireguard` in the
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`wireguard` volume — losing the hub key means re-peering every host.
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## Hiding the site while you build
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Settings → Website visibility. Outsiders then get a placeholder (503,
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`noindex`), while anyone on the management VPN and any signed-in operator keeps
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seeing the real thing. The console stays reachable either way, so the switch can
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always be flipped back.
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