App-level persistent IP ban for Clusev's own login (distinct from the remote-fleet
Fail2banService): BannedIp model, BruteforceGuard service, guests-only BlockBannedIp
middleware, Login/2FA hooks + audit, a new Anmeldeschutz settings tab, clusev:unban CLI.
Hardened after an adversarial multi-lens review: documented IP trust model (Caddy sole
proxy, prod-only trustProxies), guests-only enforcement so an authed operator is never
locked out and can self-unban, current-IP self-whitelist, concrete cache strategy,
inet_pton CIDR matching, R5 confirm modals, errors.php for the 403 strings.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- backup field: autocomplete=off -> one-time-code (backup codes ARE one-time codes;
matches the main challenge field, the rest of the app, and the spec; restores
password-manager OTP autofill that the earlier polish broke)
- both verify() use the trait's memoised $this->pendingUser() instead of a fresh
User::find(), saving a redundant query on the failed-attempt re-render (Pint dropped
the now-unused User import in TwoFactorBackup)
- spec: align trait backing-state visibility note to the implemented 'private'
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Mount now redirects key-only users without a secure context straight to
the dedicated backup view. The main challenge form renders only for TOTP
users; a subordinate button links to two-factor.challenge.backup instead
of embedding the field inline.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Task-by-task TDD plan for Spec 1: shared CompletesTwoFactorChallenge trait,
new TwoFactorBackup component + guest route + view, main-view redesign
(form gated to TOTP users, backup button, mount->backup redirect for
key-only-no-secure-context), i18n keys, and full R12/R15 verification.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Spec 1 of 2 for the 2FA challenge rework. Moves the backup (recovery) code
off the combined challenge screen into a dedicated /two-factor-challenge/backup
route + view, behind a 'Backup-Code verwenden' button; the main screen shows
only the primary factor. A key-only user without secure context (http + bare IP)
is redirected straight to the backup view. Shared rate-limit/login logic is
extracted into a CompletesTwoFactorChallenge trait so both views hit one bucket
set. IP-vs-domain factor routing is already correct (WebauthnService::available)
and unchanged. Spec 2 (auth-failure -> fail2ban hard IP ban) is out of scope here.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A checkout path containing shell syntax ($(), quotes) could otherwise inject
code into /usr/local/bin/clusev, which runs as root via 'sudo clusev update'.
Render the path through printf %q into an unquoted assignment; add a test that
a hostile path does not execute injected code.
New /help full-page Livewire component with left topic nav (like Settings),
bilingual content via per-locale Blade partials, sidebar + command-palette
entries (g h). First topic: Überblick / Overview.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Spec for a bilingual /help page (left topic nav like Settings) covering all
settings, a generic reverse-proxy setup guide, and the 2FA access-path note
(security key only over the HTTPS domain; backup code on the bare-IP/HTTP path;
TOTP works everywhere). Also generalize the external-TLS hint copy (no product
name).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
With one CSS + one JS entry the <link rel=preload> sits next to the matching
stylesheet/script and adds no value, but it triggers Chrome's 'preloaded but
not used' console warning (amplified by DevTools 'Disable cache', which
double-fetches the CSS). Disable preload tag generation; stylesheet and script
still load normally.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Even with authenticatorAttachment=cross-platform, Bitwarden's extension
intercepted navigator.credentials.create and offered to save a passkey. Add the
WebAuthn L3 'hints: [security-key]' to both registration and assertion options;
browsers and passkey managers that honor hints step aside and let the hardware
key prompt through. Injected into the client payload only (the session copy used
for server validation is unchanged).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Registration set no authenticatorSelection, so the browser offered the
passkey-manager 'save passkey' flow (Bitwarden) instead of prompting for the
YubiKey. Now request a cross-platform, non-resident, presence-only credential:
authenticatorAttachment=cross-platform (roaming key, not a platform/manager
passkey), residentKey=discouraged (non-discoverable second factor — what keeps
passkey managers out), userVerification=discouraged (single touch, no PIN).
Login assertion also uses discouraged so it is: insert key, one tap, done.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
WebauthnService::available() keyed on request()->isSecure(), which is false in
external-proxy mode (the forwarded https scheme isn't trusted without
TRUSTED_PROXY_CIDR) — so hardware keys were locked even though the panel runs
over HTTPS on the domain. Gate on being reached via the active domain instead
(always HTTPS through the front door); the bare-IP recovery host stays locked.
A core security feature no longer depends on an optional proxy setting.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A single-file bind mount of the Caddyfile kept the original inode, so a
git pull that replaces the file never reached a running caddy, and up -d does
not recreate it for a content-only change — Caddy fixes (e.g. the 0.9.18
WebSocket fix) silently never deployed. Mount the docker/caddy directory
instead (reflects the live file) and force-recreate the caddy container on
every install/update so Caddyfile changes reliably take effect.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- reverbClient() now returns wss://<domain>:443 when the active domain is being
served (the HTTPS front door), instead of deriving wss://host:80 from a request
that looks like plain HTTP:80 behind an external TLS proxy. Bare-IP recovery
stays plain ws.
- Caddy no longer redirects the /app/* /apps/* WS paths to https when the upstream
already terminated TLS (X-Forwarded-Proto: https) — that redirect broke the
WebSocket in external-proxy mode.
- The 'TLS active' status card no longer claims Let's Encrypt issuance in
external-proxy mode; it states TLS is provided by the upstream proxy.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Behind an external TLS proxy, Clusev's own Caddy only honors the upstream's
X-Forwarded-Proto when TRUSTED_PROXY_CIDR is set. Without it the app saw http,
asset() emitted http:// URLs, and the HTTPS page's CSP ('self') blocked them —
the panel loaded with no CSS/JS over the domain. PanelScheme now forces the URL
root + scheme to https://<domain> whenever the active domain is being served,
regardless of the (possibly untrusted) request scheme. The bare-IP recovery
path returns earlier and stays on HTTP.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Mirror the update button (0.9.15): requestRestart() now returns bool and
restartNow() shows an error toast (pointing at sudo ./update.sh) when the
sentinel can't be written, instead of a 'restarting' state that never resolves.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The prod image baked the app user at uid 1002, but install.sh chowns the
bind-mounted ./run to the clusev host user. On a host where clusev != 1002 the
app process could not write the restart/update sentinel — the dashboard button
showed 'läuft' while nothing happened on the server. Pass APP_UID/APP_GID =
HOST_UID/HOST_GID into the prod build so the in-image app user matches clusev
and ./run is writable. Also surface a failed sentinel write as an error toast
instead of a stuck 'running' state (requestUpdate now returns bool).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The available-update banner + button now appear automatically when the page
opens, instead of only after clicking 'check'. autoCheck() runs via wire:init
(async, non-render-blocking) and no-ops while an update is in progress so it
never clobbers the running/poll state.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
boban