The 2fa.codes_fresh reveal flag is now a timestamp (set at enrollment) and
RecoveryCodes::mount() only reveals within [now-600s, now], symmetric to the
download-grant window. A reveal flag whose modal never opened can no longer
re-reveal the codes later in the session. FirstFactorCodesTest asserts the
flag is an int.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Two hardening features completed in parallel (each with its own spec + tests),
sharing call sites (TwoFactorSetup, WebauthnKeys, routes) so committed together:
- ConfirmAction token hardening: destructive confirm flows now carry a server-issued,
single-use, signed token (App\Support\Confirm\ConfirmToken) instead of trusting a
client-mutable event/params/auditTarget. Every #[On] apply handler consumes + validates
the token (forged/replayed/direct-bypass calls no-op). Server-scoped per action; closes
the codebase-wide confirm-bypass + audit-forgery vector across Security, Sessions, Users,
WebauthnKeys, Servers\Show, Services, System, Files.
- Backup-code airtight reveal: codes are revealed via a transient channel, not a persisted
Livewire property, so a captured/replayed snapshot can't re-render them; the recovery
download is grant-gated.
Full suite green (162).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Stored recovery codes were re-viewable two ways after their one-time
reveal. Both paths are now closed so codes are only viewable/downloadable
right after a fresh generation (enrollment or regenerate).
HOLE 1 — RecoveryCodes::$revealed was a mutable public Livewire prop, so
a crafted /livewire/update could flip it to true and make render() emit
stored codes. Annotated with #[Locked]; Livewire now rejects any
client-side write (set still happens server-side in mount()/regenerate()).
HOLE 2 — two-factor.recovery.download was auth-gated only, so any authed
user could GET it anytime to re-download stored codes. Added a one-time
session grant (2fa.download_grant) put alongside the existing
2fa.codes_fresh wherever codes are freshly generated (TwoFactorSetup,
WebauthnKeys, RecoveryCodes::regenerate); the route now
abort_unless(pull(grant), 403) before streaming — one download per fresh
generation, later direct hits 403.
Tests: lock rejection + download-grant lifecycle (forbidden → granted ok
→ consumed forbidden). Full suite 137 passed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Backup (recovery) codes must be viewable ONLY at the moment they are
generated — at first-factor enrollment or on regenerate — and NEVER
re-viewable afterward from "Backup-Codes verwalten".
- Modals\RecoveryCodes: add server-gated $revealed. mount() pulls a
one-time session flag (2fa.codes_fresh); regenerate() sets it. render()
emits codes ONLY when revealed, so a client cannot tamper a flag to
re-view stored codes.
- View: revealed state shows codes grid + download + warning + close;
hidden state shows a security notice + Neu erzeugen + close (no codes,
no download).
- TwoFactorSetup::confirm() and WebauthnKeys::register() put
2fa.codes_fresh on first-factor code generation (put, survives the
redirect + later openModal request).
- Add recovery_hidden_notice (DE/EN parity).
- Tests: manage view hides codes; fresh flag reveals once; regenerate
reveals the new set; first-factor paths set the flag.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
'Eingebautes TLS' (detail moves to the description line); placeholder is just the
example host (the 'leer = IP' hint is already in the help text).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
On the Server-Details security section, a single installed tool was capped at
lg:max-w-2xl and left-aligned, leaving a large void to its right. Now a lone
panel spans the full content width and splits its own body into two columns on
lg ($lone flag): firewall = defaults/state | rules list; fail2ban = status
summary + view-bans | whitelist (ignoreip). Two tools keep the side-by-side
lg:grid-cols-2 grid. All wire:click / $dispatch bindings, buttons, and __() keys
preserved; no new lang keys.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The System page was just constrained to max-w-3xl — narrower, not designed.
Rework it into an intentional composition at max-w-5xl:
- Critical alerts (restart-required + bare-IP) are now full-width banners
above the working area, not buried in stacked inset blocks.
- A 2-column lg grid separates "do" from "know": left/main panel holds the
actionable form (domain input + Speichern, TLS-mode selector); right/side
panel is the status & recovery stack (access address, TLS state, SSH reset).
- Release-Kanal stays a full-width band below. Everything stacks to one
column on mobile.
- Header HTTPS/Plaintext pill made more prominent; domain Save promoted to
the primary action.
All wire bindings (confirmDomain, confirmTlsMode, restartNow, restartPending/
restartRequested) and every __() key preserved; two new section-label keys
(section_config, section_status) added with DE/EN parity. Tactical-Terminal
tokens only, no inline styles, existing component kit reused.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The "Gesperrte IPs ansehen" modal did its SSH Fail2banService::status read
in mount(), so clicking the trigger blocked for seconds with no spinner
before the modal appeared.
Split mount() into an instant mount() (stores serverId only) plus a
load() method fired by wire:init, mirroring Services\Index. While
! $loaded the view renders a 4-row skeleton inside the max-h-96 scroll
container; once loaded it renders the real jail/IP list (or empty/error).
The unban flow still re-reads via loadJails() and dispatches
fail2banChanged, keeping #[Locked] $serverId and the audit intact.
Adds Fail2banBansModalTest covering the instant mount (status never
called), load() rendering the list, read-error surfacing, and both
unban success (audit + refresh + dispatch) and failure paths.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Multi-user admin accounts, database-backed session management (list + per-user/global
revoke), auto-restart sentinel (no docker socket), SMTP configuration, audit-log
retention, plus the Settings split into per-tab components and the UI batch (image
preview, fail2ban bans modal, show-password, system polish).
BREAKING: sessions move from Redis to the database — all existing sessions are
invalidated on update (log in once again).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Codex P2: concurrent deletes could both pass the >1 check. Now the count + delete run in
one transaction under a row lock.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
System page capped to a readable width; Speichern gets a proper save glyph (added
save/eye/eye-off/user-plus to the icon set); operator-facing 'Caddy' softened to
neutral wording; added a 'fully locked out -> SSH + clusev:reset-admin' hint. Settings
email field to type=text.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Login + password-change + reset + forgot get an eye toggle. Email fields switch to
type=text so validation lives only in the Livewire class (consistent custom messages).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Opening an image now renders it (SFTP base64 data-URI, 5 MB cap, save disabled for
images) instead of the text editor. Recovery-codes modal buttons realigned + the
close button relabeled 'Schließen' (it only closes). All modal textareas resize-none.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The fail2ban-Status panel listed every jail + banned IP inline (very long). Now a
compact summary + 'Gesperrte IPs ansehen' opens a scrollable modal (Fail2banBans)
that reuses Fail2banService::status/unban and dispatches fail2banChanged. serverId
is #[Locked].
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Re-applies the onboarding gate to /livewire/update component calls, not just the
initial page GET, so a component mounted while onboarded cannot run destructive
actions after the account is reverted to must_change_password mid-session.
Addresses the codebase-wide Codex finding flagged during the SSH-key-provision review.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Optional pluggable 2FA (TOTP and/or WebAuthn, or off) + recovery-codes modal,
live capped journal, command-palette server search, settings tabs in URL,
fail2ban lone-box layout, and SSH-key auto-provision with safe password-login
disable.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Guard the TOTP verifyKey call behind hasTotp() so a key-only user's null
two_factor_secret never reaches Google2FA::verifyKey(); they reset via a
backup code. Also adds the reset_no_2fa_note lang key (EN + DE) rendered
on the forgot-password form explaining the no-2FA recovery options.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- TwoFactorSetup: move to app layout (hosts wire-elements/modal), guard on hasTotp() not hasTwoFactorEnabled(), redirect to settings and flash open_recovery_modal on first TOTP enrollment
- WebauthnKeys.register(): drop hasTwoFactorEnabled() guard (first key may be the sole factor), generate codes + dispatch openModal on first key enrollment
- Settings\Index: add #[Url] on $tab, add $openRecoveryModal flag, mount() reads the flash and lands on the security tab
- settings/index.blade.php: x-init block dispatches openModal when $openRecoveryModal is set
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
boban